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There is plenty of evidence, e.g. in mathematics, in the sciences, and in economics,
that rationality is paramount to all other cognitive powers. There is further evidence that
intentions are borne and originate in the mind. We therefore might be inclined to conclude
that rational intentions are brought about in the mind internally by the best of all cognitive
powers. In this case it would be enough to analyse mental representations which are
antecedent to decision making in order to find the basic ingredients causing rational or
irrational intentions. But there is neither evidence for representations of this sort nor for
mental causes of rational intentions. It is true that intending is a mental state or act, but it
would, indeed, be false to believe that intentions are produced or brought about internally, i.e.,
without reference to the external world.2
Some intentions seem to be irrational although their mental origin is not different from
the origin of rational ones. I shall argue that this indifference of origin of rational and
irrational intentions is due to the fact that intentions – like all volitional attitudes - have
external meanings. This implies that the criteria of rationality themselves are external to the
mental activities of reasoning and intending. ‘External’ here means that the contents of
volitional attitudes are individuated by the objects they are directed to and not by the mental
acts or performances of intending themselves.3 I shall further argue that the indifference of
origin of rational and irrational intentions sheds light on the hybrid nature of rationality. For
the sake of argument I shall use examples from the theory of choice. The gist of my argument
is that intentional states enable us to choose mental acts, speech acts or non-verbal actions
without reflecting alternatives beforehand.4 This links up with the debate about voluntary
action in this volume. Proust in her present paper tries to jump the belief-desire-model and
follows K. Bach holding that some actions – “minimal actions” as they are called – neither
presuppose conscious decisions nor intentions. My claims are a lot weaker. From what I
                                                
1 I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Martin Rechenauer, Bettina Walde, Sabine Massen and Tillmann
Vierkant for helpful discussions and valuable criticisms and recommendations.
2 Intentions may well refer indirectly to internal entities. I may, e.g., intend to go for a walk in order to overcome my
headache, or I may intend to solve a mathematical problem by using a certain method of proof. But I cannot intend
any pain, or pleasure, or mathematical operation directly.
3 This is in accordance with what the late Miss Anscombe wrote in her seminal book Intention (Oxford 1957): „...
intention is never a performance in the mind...“(p.49)
4 For arguments to the same effect see K. Bach („A Representational Theory of Action“, in: Philosophical Studies 34
(1978), 361-379) and J. Proust in this volume.
3argue, actions may be intentional even if they do not result from deliberate choice. I therefore
need not tackle the belief-desire-model myself.
Volitional attitudes and external meanings
It is not obvious why volitional attitudes, like, e.g., intending or wanting, should have
external meanings. It is textbook knowledge that these attitudes are akin to other forms of
intentionality or intentional states like, e.g., believing, or perceiving. As a common feature
intentional states are directed to some objects5. If I intend or want to go for a walk it’s the
walking which renders content to my intending or wanting. If I believe that two plus two
makes four it’s a piece of arithmetic which is the content of what I believe. No independent
meanings, no ‘intending as such’ nor ‘believing as such’ seem to be left if I omit the walking
or the arithmetical operation, respectively. Therefore, over and above their word-meanings
‘intending’, ‘believing’ and other intentional states have no cognitive or semantic content of
their own.
There are some attitudinal differences worth being noted. While the intentional states
of believing and knowing represent cognitive attitudes, intending and wanting belong to the
group of volitional attitudes. Being members of different families of attitudes the contents of
believing and intending differ significantly in terms of their temporal conditions of
satisfaction. While I may believe, or think what is already known, I cannot intend or want
what I believe is already the case. I may, of course, intend, e.g., to close the front door, not
knowing that somebody else already did. From a subjective point of view the external
meanings of volitional attitudes are not constitutive to these attitudes as they stand. In other
words, the objects or contents which give meaning to these attitudes are – at least from the
viewpoint of the person who entertains these attitudes - not yet existing. If I intend, or want to
feel pleasure or are in fear of pain, it’s not the actual pleasure I’m intending or wanting, and
not the existing pain I fear but future pleasure and future pain, respectively.6 Volitional
attitudes are in general directed to the future, while cognitive attitudes are to all tenses. In
terms of tenses there is even a slight difference within the family of volitional attitudes. I may,
e.g., have always wished or wanted that some event never occurred but it wouldn’t make
sense to intend that something in the past was or was not the case.7 Wittgenstein’s famous
                                                
5 ‚Objects‘ here stands for all sorts of things like, e.g., thoughts, spatio-temporal objects, feelings, and ideas.
6 L.Wayne Sumner in his Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: University Press 1996) characterises wants in a
similar way.
7 It is possible to have intentions concerning the past. I may, e.g., intend that some past event is or will not be known
by others. The conative attitude here concerns the knowledge of some facts by other people but not the facts
themselves.
4note in his Tractatus (6.373), that the world is independent from my own will, is true at least
for the past.
Intending and choosing spontaneously
The cognitive function of all intentional states may be described as the mental capacity
to choose or select objects of knowledge, volition, and action without reflection. ‘Choice
without reflection’ sounds awkward and paradoxical. But we do, indeed, direct our attention
to contents or things without consciously considering alternatives. Without being able to offer
a reason why we, e.g., turned our attention to this person rather than that one we choose
objects of seeing, thinking, wanting, and intending without knowing why in the moment we
do.8 Let us call the choice brought about by intentional states ‘mental choice’.9
There is some unwelcome vagueness to this kind of choice. While we know mostly
what makes us choose what we believe, do, or say, we need not know exactly what makes us
choose our intentions and wants. There are two obvious exceptions, first, long-term wants and
intentions which already exist, and, second, rationalisations. Long-term intentions keep
arousing deliberation and reasoning. If I always wanted to hike in the Hindu Kush I shall keep
thinking about how to realise this intention till I find the opportunity to really do so. As to
rationalisations, we are, of course, in retrospect, always able to answer the question why we
intended or wanted to do something or other. But rationalisations must not be sincere and are
not terribly reliable if we are really interested in finding out what made us choose our
intentions. Leaving long-term intentions and rationalisations of intentions aside, in order to
entertain volitional attitudes we need no reasons to do so. In other words, we need no states of
affairs which may count as reasons for intending or wanting. Volitional attitudes may well be
taken spontaneously.
Now, ‘spontaneity’ is a rather vague notion with an air of delusion. It should,
therefore, need further qualification if it is of any use at all. The spontaneity of choice in the
domain of intentional states or acts has two connotations, first, being undetermined, and,
second, being caused or enacted without deliberation. Considering the first, volitional
attitudes may count as being spontaneous in so far as they are brought about by mental
choices which are – at least from the first person point of view - causally undetermined by any
earlier choices. It is important to differentiate between conscious and subconscious causes. If I
hold that a consciously taken choice of mine is causally undetermined this will not preclude
                                                
8 In a similar vein T.M. Scanlon proposes: „Not only perceptual beliefs, but many other attitudes as well arise in us
unbidden, without conscious choice or decision.“ (What We Owe to Each Other, Cambride (Mass.)/London:
Harvard University Press 1998, 22)
5that there may be subconscious causes at work. This leaves room for conditions, constraints or
causes of choice which are either presently or generally unknown to the chooser but possibly
sub-consciously valid or empirically evident in psychological research. Considering the
second of the two connotations of spontaneity, volitional states may be called spontaneous if
their choice is not inaugurated by a process of deliberation or reasoning. This leaves further
room for all sorts of “gut reactions”10 determined by instincts, fears, or paranoia. In brief,
spontaneous choice of intentions is choice without conscious motive and without deliberate
reason.
Both these connotations merge in one and the same kind of example: E.g., my
spontaneous intention to go to the cinema after my friend told me she couldn’t make our date
for dinner this evening. May be I am disappointed and angry, may be not; may be I just heard
good news about the movie before, may be not. My intention is still spontaneous, independent
from whether I could have chosen something else. Probably, after deep and thorough
psychological scrutiny it will become obvious that there are bundles of causal chains which
explain why I chose the intention to go to the cinema as against the theatre or staying home.
Subjectively, my choice will still remain as having been taken spontaneously. It is not
causally determined by earlier choices of the same or of a similar kind and it is not taken after
reasoning or deliberation. This leaves enough room for long term intentions, emotions,
aesthetic attitudes, and tastes to influence spontaneous mental choices of intentions and wants.
These are some of the stronger candidates for the bundles of causal chains which might in the
end explain my spontaneous choice of intentions.
Mental choice
I introduced the notion of ‘mental choice’ claiming that it is the capacity of intentional
states to choose their own objects and thereby their contents. The exercise of this cognitive
function is far from clear. We are, at least conceptually, at a loss to explain in detail the
faculty of directing and guiding ones perceptual and cognitive attention to whatever available
contents of intending. We therefore, gladly, take it that these contents individuate what we
intend. But, of course, in order to avoid circular explanations, we shall not hold that these
contents will direct our attention externally. Otherwise, the intentional contents would cause
their respective intentions backwards, as it were.
To direct ones attention to an object rather seems to be a process of mutual fit in which
an individual’s attention and the special features or even attractions of an object merge nicely.
                                                                                                                                                        
9 I shall consider some aspects of mental and rational choice later. Both kinds of choices can be represented in
standard and non-standard versions of choice.
6It looks as if the direction of ones attention is a co-operative mixture of active and passive
between a subject and an object. On the background of a subject’s pro-attitudes, including
emotional dispositions, likings and dislikings, one and the same object seems appealing at a
time but not at another one. In the latter case the person will not even take notice of it. If I like
walking and if I want to take a break, going for a walk may seem appealing. But I may not
even think of talking a walk although I’m taking a break. This active-passive interplay is a
simple picture of what is going on when we intend to do, say, or know something.
We choose – as I argue above - many of our intentions to do something spontaneously
without being knowingly or consciously determined or caused by earlier mental choices of the
same or of a similar kind. It would, e.g., not make sense to say that I now intend to go for a
walk because I had the same intention before. But the relation between intentions, actions, and
habits is tricky. Although habits and actions following a rule are repetitive they are still
intentional activities. They express what someone is up to, i.e., his or her intention-in-action.11
The tricky bit is that the expression of intention of each action-token is in a way guaranteed
by the action-type. A certain action-type or habit is known to express a respective intention-
in-action. If I use the common words and gestures to greet people my behaviour will be
identified as greeting independent from further intentions of mine.
Nevertheless, habits do not cause but represent and express intentions. My habit of
greeting people is not the cause of my greeting Paul or Luisa. I don’t greet everybody. Habits
need some training and if they are well trained they become long term attitudes which we are
prone to follow. In so far habits make it easy to choose affiliated and conventionally used
actions. But action-types or habits will not cause action-tokens. The further are necessary in
order to identify but not sufficient to execute the respective action-tokens. The choice of an
action-token is open and leaves room for spontaneity. This may be underlined by an example
from the realm of the reproductive arts. A pianist performing will know his program by heart.
His maturity to interpret the pieces of music in his own individual way is beyond his technical
ease. His individuality and authenticity thrive on top of his technical brilliance. Spontaneity in
this case as in all other cases of intentional actions with strong habitual and repetitive aspects
presupposes a high amount of practical knowledge which operates successfully without
deliberate choice. Spontaneity is neither obviated by subconsciously valid causes nor by
practical knowledge or repetitiveness.
Looking closer to my own intentional actions I might find that some of my intentions
– like in the case of greeting - are not really chosen by myself but rather prompted by the
                                                                                                                                                        
10 I borrow this phrase from Donald Calne (Within Reason. Rationality and Human Behavior, New York 1999, 23).
7social grid of rules and habits and their sanctions and gratification. My intentions in other
cases might even result from evolutionary training to avoid pain and to pursue happiness.
Here, again, in the social and in the evolutionary case emotional dispositions and evaluative
attitudes come into play. I might as well find that consciously acquired and trained emotional
dispositions and attitudes often do the whole job of choosing even without the gravitational
forces of evolution and the social grid. Finally, all these dispositions and attitudes are mine
and there is nothing wrong or awkward if I claim authorship for choosing my intentions on
the basis of my emotions and psychological dispositions.
But then, why ‘mental choice’ and not just ‘choice’? Indeed, because choice even if it
is taken after deliberation, calculation, or reasoning, may still be spontaneous. It seems to be
an unwarranted prejudice that deliberation, reasoning, and similar mental operations count as
being void of or even obviate spontaneity. Choosing mentally is nothing else but choosing,
i.e., deciding about alternatives. All choices can be spontaneous independent from their
antecedent conditions. In order, e.g., to find an elegant and economic mathematical proof one
needs good ideas, and they got to be spontaneous even if the mathematical techniques and
operations are common practice among mathematicians. What is left of the above mentioned
two connotations of spontaneity? Mental choices are spontaneous in so far as they are neither
consciously caused after deliberation nor by earlier choices of the same kind. Nevertheless,
mental choices may have bundles of subconsciously valid causes and they may be
accompanied by conscious operations of reasoning and deliberation. But all these conditions
are not sufficient to explain the choice consciously taken.
Rationality and rational choice
Like intentionality, rationality too has a functional meaning. It’s, again, a cognitive
function which resembles the type of mental choice just described for intentional states. But
while the mental choice of intentions is generally spontaneous, the degree of spontaneity in
rational choice is to be clarified. Some differencies between mental and rational choice seem
to be obvious. As against mental choice, the choice we perform rationally – so it seems - is
caused by conscious motives and explained by deliberate reasons. If it is following
deliberation and reasoning the rationality of choice is taken in a wide sense implying non-
instrumental aims and purposes like, e.g., self-respect or social justice.12 Rationality in the
                                                                                                                                                        
11 The causally undetermined role of a person’s intention in action is analysed by Miss Anscombe (loc.cit., 34-37).
12 Rationality in the wide sense implies a number of models like, e.g., expressive rationality, and bounded rationality.
Useful surveys are offered, e.g., by B.R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality, Oxford: Blackwell 31977; F.Hahn, M. Hollis (ed.),
Philosophy and Economic Theory, Oxford: University Press 1979; M.Hollis, S.Lukes (ed.), Rationality and
Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell 1982.
8wide sense is often used as a synonym for ‘reason’. As I mentioned above, deliberation and
reasoning does not obviate spontaneity.
In a narrow sense rationality in terms of rational choice has an instrumental meaning.
This type of choice is based on motives of gain relative to some purposes or aims. It seems
that these motives make choices successful by making decisions clear and predictable. In its
latter sense, the rationality of individual behaviour is unanimously defined by the axioms
which determine the maximisation of expected utility.13 Nobody will deny the importance of
rationality in the wide sense, nor will anybody ignore that the model of rational choice offers
a clear and useful normative model of individual decision making under certainty, risk, and
uncertainty. Under certainty every agent knows exactly the utilities of his action. Under risk
or uncertainty utilities are gauged by probabilities. The Bayesian rule tells the agent to
maximise his subjectively expected utilities.14 Every rational agent behaves as if he is
motivated by the maximisation of expected utility. The theory of choice tells us how the agent
realises his motive rationally, i.e., with the utmost success relative to some intended aim.
There is no need to go into the details of expected utility theory. Thinking about
rational intentions it will be enough to recall two of the major features of rational choice: first,
its psychological groundwork, and, second, its axiomatic structure. The psychological
groundwork is more or less expressed by the motivational force of expected utility
maximisation. Francis Edgeworth’s famous conjecture – in his Mathematical Psychics (1881)
- that all individuals are driven by their pursuit of gain is a possible but not wholly adequate
descriptions of the psychological nature of this very motive. It must not necessarily be the
case that in rational decision making I am intending to get more of a certain good for myself.
It’s not greed which motivates my decision but the optimum of outcomes relative to certain
aims independent from their egotistic or altruistic nature. Why humans want to take successful
decisions is imbedded in their psychological groundwork and may remain opaque. What they
want to be successful in is made transparent by the rational decisions themselves. This is how
human psychology and mathematical axioms are co-ordinated. On top of the psychological
groundwork a small number of axioms tell us how rationality works in order to maximise
expected utility. With the axiomatic layer rational action and social exchange in general is
modelled on economic action. Edgeworth described the economy as a bazaar, “an arena in
                                                
13 For the sets of axioms for rational choice under certainty and one for rational choice under uncertainty see
S.Hargreaves Heap, M.Hollis, B.Lyons, R.Sugden, A.Weale, The Theory of Choice, Oxford: Blackwell 1992, 5-11.
14 The Bayesian rule contains a subjective probability function and a subjective utility function. Both these functions
come down to the value of expected utility.
9which everyone is free to haggle with everyone else.”15 I won’t pursue Edgeworth’s economic
ideas here. But the way he gives pure exchange economy a mathematical face makes it
obvious how rationality ascends from the psychological and motivational groundwork via the
mathematical structure of exchange to the maximisation of expected utility. There is no doubt,
rationality in the narrow sense has psychological roots. At least in theory, it originates from
non-rational dispositions. But these dispositions do not explain the decisions people take. The
theory explains their rationality externally on basis of the pay-offs they gain.
Rational paradox and the contexts of choice
Historically, we may now remember Hume’s notorious plea for the passions as being
the masters of reason. But I don’t think that this piece of history is of any help if we want to
understand rational intentions. What we learn from expected utility theory – if we want to - is
that the psychology at the bottom of the theory will never carry us anywhere near rational
choice on its own. The problem is that non-rational dispositions and motives are blind and
clueless without the theoretical scaffolding which is offered by expected utility theory.
Therefore no Humean internalist will be able to explain the rationality or irrationality of
choices. On the other hand expected utility theory is empty and inefficient without the
motivational force from some psychological groundwork. It is difficult to explain how
motives become forceful without cognitive guidance. One may, of course, try Hume again
that the passions press reason into slavery and make them willynilly develop the theory
needed. Instrumentalism is definitely not void of plausibility. As long as my motives are
strong enough I’ll do anything I can to realise my intentions; this is the message of
instrumentalism. But, as we know from the sub-optimal results of non-cooperation in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the dictates of the passions will not guarantee maximal success not even
with theoretical help. Too easily rationality turns into irrationality.16
Obviously, the fit between the psychological groundwork and the instruments offered
by decision theory to reach success is not quite happy. And I am not trying to improve it. I am
rather interested in the incongruency itself and what we learn from it. It tells us, first, that we
cannot generally proceed from the mental or psychological origin of intentions to rational
outcomes even if we know what we should do to behave rationally in terms of the theory. It
tells us, further, that our preferences do not agree with those norms of rationality that the
standard theory prescribes. The axiomatic structure of the theory seems to be unable to
                                                
15 Robert Sugden, „Anarchic Order“, in: S.Hargreaves Heap, M.Hollis, B.Lyons, R.Sugden, A.Weale, The Theory of
Choice, Oxford 1992, 191.
16 This is in brief the message of Amartya Sen’s „Rational Fools: a Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of
Economic Theory“, in: F.Hahn, M.Hollis (ed.), Philosophy and Economic Theory, loc.cit., 87-109.
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account for what very many of us take to be the most rational thing to do. The story I have in
mind is the Allais Paradox.17
The French economist M. Allais published a paper in which he criticised some of the
axioms of expected utility theory.18 His idea was to argue that people choose contrary to some
of the assumptions made by the standard theory.19  In order to show this Allais offered two
problems which are described by the following lists. The pay-offs on these lists are in money
in whatever currency:
Problem 1: choose between
A:   2500 with probability 0.33
       2400 with probability 0.66
             0 with probability 0.01
B:   2400 with certainty
Instead of problem 1 you now face a slightly different problem.
Problem 2: choose between
C:   2500 with probability 0.33
             0 with probability 0.67
D:   2400 with probability 0.34
             0 with probability 0.66
As it turned out in experiments20, many people choose B in Problem 1 and C in
problem 2 and only few people choose A and D, respectively. This is, indeed, what Allais
supposed. Let us consider the risks implied in the two problems. A is obviously riskier than B.
It seems unreasonable to take the risk of getting nothing for a relatively small increase. Most
people will therefore reason that it seems preferable to be on the safe side and choose B
instead of A. In problem 2 C looks a bit riskier than D, but here it seems reasonable to take
the higher risk for the larger pay-off.
Why should these choices be paradoxical? The paradox is due to expected utility
theory. According to the axiomatically grounded recommendations of the theory, if I choose
B in problem 1 I shall have to choose D in problem 2; and if I choose A in problem 1 I shall
have to choose C in problem 2. The axiom which obliges me to follow this course of decision
                                                
17 I borrow Robert Sugden’s version of the story in his „How People Choose“, in: J.Hargreaves Heap e.a., loc.cit, 45.
18 M. Allais, „Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école
américaine“, Econometrica, 21 (1953), 503-556.
19 There are other paradoxes of a similar kind trying to question the empirical adequacy of the postulates of utility
theory, e.g., the Ellsberg Paradox; for details see D. Ellsberg, „Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms“, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 75 (1961), 643-669.
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making is the independence axiom. It tells us that any preference between A and B should not
be influenced by components which are irrelevant. If it is irrelevant for my choosing B (2400
with certainty) that a higher amount (2500) is offered with probability 0.33 this very option
must be ignored in problem 2 as well. I must prefer D to C. But if I prefer A to B in problem 1
I obviously go in for better outcomes even if they are offered with lower probability. I am
even prepared to ignore an outcome offered with certainty. In order to choose consistently I
have to prefer C to D in this case. Those who choose B in problem 1 and C in problem 2 are
sinning against the independence axiom.
It should be easy to correct expected utility theory if it doesn’t suit human behaviour.
We could, e.g., delete or modify the axiom of independence, as it seems to be too demanding.
Allais’ paradox arises because people choose options which are irrational in terms of the
theory. It seems over-ambitious and counter-intuitive to blame people for behaving
irrationally just because they choose – unimpressed by the theory - according to their own
expectations of winning.21 Their intentions to win certain pay-offs seem to be both rational
and irrational. Either the theory is wrong or people’s choices are, depending on which
perspective we choose. This is what I mention at the beginning where I claim that some
intentions seem to be irrational although their mental origin does not differ from the origin of
rational intentions. The external meanings which determine the contents of intentions in these
cases are either the pay-offs chosen by a great majority of people or the pay-offs offered by
the standard theory. But the rationality or irrationality of both of these options are determined
externally by the respective pay-offs.
Both of those pay-offs are external to the psychological groundwork or motivational
dispositions of ordinary choosers. People’s preferences for pay-offs depend on the contexts in
which the pay-offs are offered to them. The preferences for pay-offs neither derive from
individual psychological dispositions nor from the individuals’ internal representations of
long-term preferences like, e.g., life-plans. On the other hand, people’s general attitudes
towards risks and pay-offs are primed by their characters. But my personal character will not
explain each of my choices. My timidity, e.g., will prompt me to choose a pay-off offered
with certainty. But, first, I won’t take any of the pay-offs which are certain if the risks of
considerably larger pay-offs are reasonable. Secondly, any success of mine will give
buoyancy to my taking greater risks in the next round of choices. My former timidity will
                                                                                                                                                        
20 One of the most well-known experiments was undertaken by Kahnemann and Tversky; see their „Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk“, Econometrica 43 (1979), 263-291. The pay-offs in the above lists are
taken from this experiment.
21 T.M. Scanlon rightly argues that violating axioms of choice is not enough to criticise people as being irrational
(What We Owe to Each Other, loc.cit., 31).
12
only return after one or two unfortunate decisions before my confidence to win is
strengthened again. Choices will always express timidity or boldness or other characters but
the latter do not explain the choices themselves. This is a further reason why people’s
intentions to choose are determined externally.
The external nature of the contexts of choice is finally evident in Robert Sugden’s
Regret Theory.22 I need not go into the mathematical details of the theory in order to give a
brief sketch of Sugden’s basic idea. While Allais tries to liberate choosers from the axiom of
independence Sugden is prepared to give up the axiom of transitivity for individual
preferences. This is illustrated by his example: Imagine three situations E, F, and G and their
respective probabilities p(E)=0,1, p(F)=0,4, and p(G)=0,5.23 These situations figure in two
options of choice A and B:
Option A
0 -    if E or F 1000+e  -   if G
Option B
1000  -   if E or F 0  -   if G
The pay-offs are in money and ‘e’ is an amount slightly larger than 0. Now, as long as
the set of options is limited to A and B almost every theory will recommend A. The picture
changes if there is one further option C available.
Option C
5000  -   if E 0  -   if F or G
Considering the order of preferences {A , B, C} Sugden argues if e is sufficiently small
B is preferable to A. Option C changes the original order of preference of A over B. The
switch of preferences from A to B and the implied violation of the axiom of transitivity is
easily explained: If we choose A and E occurs our regret will be considerably deeper with
option C than without. Of course, it all depends on the negligibility of e. Nevertheless, the
change of preferences is brought about externally by a contextual change.
                                                
22 Robert Sugden, „An Axiomatic Foundation for Regret Theory“, Journal of Economic Theory 60 (1993), 159-180.
23 p(E)=0,1 reads: the probability that E occurs is 0,1.
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I shall neither discuss the general consequences of weakening the axiom of transitivity
nor shall I defend Sugden’s Regret Theory. His theory plausibly and convincingly shows that
the alternatives of choice are not to be characterised by some intrinsic features of the
alternatives themselves but by their mutual relations. These relations change relative to the
contexts in which the alternatives of choice are offered. Finally, whenever these contexts
change our preferences change as well.
The incongruency which I mentioned earlier between the psychological groundwork
of decision making and the standard theory of rational choice is partly overcome by the
different strategies of either weakening the axiom of transitivity or giving up the axiom of
independence. In both cases the norms of rationality are adjusted to the possible changes of
individual preferences. It is now possible to proceed without paradox from the psychological
groundwork of decision making to the revised standards of rationality. Whatever revision of
the set of axioms of the standard theory of rationality we accept the very possibility of
revising the set corroborates the externalist account of rational decision making.
After all, both the analyses of mental and of rational choice showed that intentions are
individuated by external meanings. While this issues from the spontaneity of mental choice in
volitional attitudes it is due to the contextual character of preferences in rational choice. It
first seemed that rational choice was not spontaneous but governed by the single motive to
maximise expected utility. The advantage of the single motive seemed to be that it makes
decisions clear and predictable, and that it guarantees maximal success. If this was the case
rational choice would be determined internally by an intrinsic motive of gain. We now see
that this is not the case. Obviously rational decision making is influenced by external factors
to be found in its context. And these factors are beyond the control of the standard theory of
choice. Each individual’s psychological groundwork including character, emotions and
evaluative attitudes play a role.24 This is not surprising but it shows how inept the internalist
Humean picture of the passions pressing reason into slavery is, at least from the view-point of
rational decision making. The passions are too clueless and changeable to control reason. On
the other hand, reason is unable to control the passions to the same effect.
Finally, rational choice can be as spontaneous as the mental choice of intentions. Even
if we assume that we all share similar motives the choices we make are not caused by these
motives directly. We choose our intentions to maximise our expected utilities basically the
                                                
24 As Donald Calne resumes: “We favor certainty if we are dealing with a potential gain and uncertainty if we are
facing a potential loss. These attitudes are emotional – we minimize our anxiety by making decisions in this way.” (D.
Calne, loc.cit., 288)
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same way as we choose intentions mentally, i.e., independent from the clues and fixations
which might have accrued from earlier choices.
At the beginning I mention the hybrid nature of rationality. Rationality is at least in its
narrow, instrumental sense a hybrid. It is partly based on some psychological groundwork or
motivational set and partly on theoretical and axiomatic structure. None of these parts is
sufficient for rational decision making, and their relation is – as we learnt from Allais and
Sugden – precarious. Why is rationality a hybrid? Because it combines two incongruent
ingredients, psychological groundwork and theoretical structure. The mutual influence of
these counterparts to form a coherent whole is ad hoc and a matter of compromise.
In order to determine the rationality of intentions we need to know their objects in a
context of alternatives. Neither the psychological groundwork nor the theoretical structure of
the standard theory offer a universal and conclusive basis to judge whether intentions are
rational or not. Rational intentions are determined externally. No intention is intrinsically
rational. The consequences of this observation in ethics are to be considered carefully at least
for theories which are based on the intrinsic nature of moral rationality.25
                                                
25 The most prominent example is I. Kant who in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals argues from the
intrinsic goodness and moral rationality of the „good will“.
